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Individual differences in behavioural inhibition
explain free riding in public good games when
punishment is expected but not implemented
Anya Skatova1,2* and Eamonn Ferguson1
Abstract
Background: The literature on social dilemmas and punishment focuses on the behaviour of the punisher.
However, to fully explain the effect of punishment on cooperation, it is important to understand the psychological
mechanisms influencing the behaviour of those who expect to be punished. This paper examines whether the
expectation of punishment, rather than the implementation of punishment is sufficient to prevent individuals from
free riding. Individual differences in the punishment sensitivity have been linked to both threat responses (flight,
fight, fear system, or the FFFS) and to the response to the uncertainty of punishment (BIS-anxiety).The paper,
therefore, examines if individual differences in BIS-anxiety and FFFS can explain some of the variability in free riding
in the face of implemented and non-implemented punishment.
Methods: Participants took part in a series of one-shot Public Goods Games (PGGs) facing two punishment
conditions (implemented and non-implemented) and two standard non-punishment PGGs. The punishment was
implemented as a centralized authority punishment (i.e., if one participant contributed less than their group
members, they were automatically fined). Individual contribution levels and presence/absence of zero contributions
indexed free riding. Individual differences in behavioural inhibition were assessed.
Results: Individuals contributed more under the threat of punishment (both implemented and non-implemented).
However, individuals contributed less when the punishment was not implemented compared to when it was.
Those scoring high in BIS-anxiety contributed more when the punishment expectations were not implemented.
This effect was not observed for FFFS.
Conclusion: Supporting previous research, punishment had a powerful effect in increasing contribution levels in
the PGGs. However, when expected punishment was not implemented, individual differences in punishment
sensitivity, specifically in BIS-anxiety, were related to fewer contributions (increased free riding) as compared to the
situation when punishment was not implemented. This has implications for our understanding of why some
people cannot resist the temptation to free ride, even when facing possible punishment for their actions. Our
findings suggest that the diminished functioning of mechanisms, associated with trait behavioural inhibition, can
partly explain such behaviours.
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Background
Cooperation is a fundamental feature of human society.
Yet cooperation often has a cost implication and conse-
quently people are not always cooperative, and choose in-
stead to free ride. Free riding is reduced, however, when it
is punished [1-4]. Different forms of punishment are effec-
tive in eliminating free riding and sustaining cooperation,
such as peer or altruistic punishment (when members of
the group punish/fine other free riding group members, at
their own cost), central authority punishment (if someone
contributes less than their group on average they are fined
through an automated rule) and third party punishment
(free riders are punished by a person who is not a part of
their group) [5,6]. Most research has focused on how dif-
ferent forms of punishment affect cooperation levels and
when and why individuals choose to punish free riders
[3,7]. However, to understand when sanctions effectively
sustain cooperation, it is important to understand the psy-
chological mechanisms influencing the behaviour of those
who receive or are threatened with punishment: what
makes them choose to cooperate?
There are relatively few studies that have examined the
psychological mechanisms of why some individuals co-
operate in social dilemmas and others do not. Scheres and
Sanfey [8] explained cooperation via strategic reciproca-
tion (cooperating when you expect others to cooperate in
return) and individuals’ reward sensitivity, see also [9].
The current experiment examined if a different, but
related, psychological mechanism, sensitivity to punish-
ment, can explain some of the variability in responses to
punishment in the social dilemma scenario [10]. Individual
differences in sensitivity to punishment predict greater be-
haviour responses under conditions of threat and punish-
ment [11,12]. As such, punishment sensitivity may
plausibly explain some of the variation in free riding under
the threat of punishment, within the context of a Public
Goods Game.
Public goods games and punishment risk
In a typical PGG several participants (usually four) are
matched to play together in a group and are given an en-
dowment of Monetary Unites (MUs). They are aware that
they can keep these MUs for themselves, or invest the
MUs into a public account. All money invested into the
public account is multiplied and distributed equally to all
group members. If everybody from the group invests
equally, then all group members get equal returns and in-
crease their profit. If individuals do not invest equally,
those who invested less (the free riders) ultimately receive
more money than those who invested more, because
everybody gets an equal return from the public good. This
scenario creates a dilemma: an opportunity to cooperate
or to free ride. One effective strategy to reduce free riding
is to introduce a punishment system, whereby free riders
can either be punished by other players or by a centralized
rule (a central authority (CA) punishment). As a result,
Public Goods Games (PGGs) with punishment provide a
model of social sanctions against free riding [13].
In laboratory PGG experiments, cooperation increases
as a result of punishment for free riding [13,14]. In real
life, the exact likelihood of punishment is often unknown
and individuals have to estimate the likelihood of punish-
ment based on experience: such as whether an expected
punishment occurred or not. For example, there may be
fixed speeding limits and fines for exceeding them, how-
ever, there may be times when one speeds but no fine is
forthcoming: a police officer did not notice the speeding
car, the speed camera was not functioning, the speed may
was only slightly over the limit. Similarly in a legal system,
a crime have varying punishment alternatives (a formal
caution or warning, fine or community sentence), or the
person may not be caught at all. Indeed evidence suggests
that individuals make a judgement regarding behaviour
which is partly based on how likely punishment is to
occur in a given situation based on their own experience
and the prevailing conditions [15].
The majority of the research on punishment in social
dilemmas has focused on peer-punishment. It has been
demonstrated that uncertainty about whether a punish-
ment will be implemented leads to more cooperation and
a reduction in free riding, at least in a peer-punishment
scenario [16]. Uncertainty affects punishment levels in the
PGGs: for example, even if the information about beha-
viour of group partners (if they cooperate or free ride) is
not reliable [17], people still punish, even though their net
payoffs decrease [18]. In a peer-punishment PGG experi-
ment, Fudenberg and Pathak [19] demonstrated that indi-
viduals contributed more in an ‘observed’ punishment
condition (i.e. after each game participants were informed
about the punishment points they received), than in an
‘unobserved’ punishment condition (i.e. all punishment
points were revealed at the end of the experiment). The
difference in the conditions could be linked to expecta-
tions concerning whether or not punishment is going to
be implemented. In the observed condition participants
received the feedback on how many punishment points
did they get after each game, throughout the experiment.
In the unobserved condition, punishment was implemen-
ted but participants did not have information about their
punishment points until the end of the experiment.
Therefore, their estimation of the risk of being punished
would not have been based on direct observations and
their expectation may have been less accurate as a result.
In this study we examine how contribution levels change
in response to a change in the punishment risk, when the
punishment rule is either implemented or not.
A way to examine how the expectation of punishment
and the certainty of its administration affect individual
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behaviour is to control levels of punishment experimen-
tally. In the peer-punishment situation a punisher may
decide whether or not to fine a free rider depending on
whether they consider the extent of the free riding worthy
of punishment. For instance, in Fudenberg and Pathak
[19], punishment levels received in the games varied bet-
ween individuals, depending on the amount of punish-
ment partners decided to administer. As the primary goal
of our research is to look into the psychological reasons
behind behavioural responses to punishment, we used a
CA punishment rule in the PGGs to control the delivery
of punishment.
A CA punishment design allows for higher experimental
control over punishment expectations, with a fixed rule
for the punishment of free riding. In the current study,
participants were told that punishment was possible if
they transgressed a specified rule. However, in one condi-
tion participants were actually punished if they trans-
gressed the rule (implemented punishment), and in the
other condition they were not punished even if they trans-
gressed the rule (non-implemented punishment). The
central question here was: when people break a rule and
are not caught, is the threat that the punishment might be
applied at some point still sufficient to promote coope-
ration, or would the unrealised threat of punishment lead
people to start free riding again?
The few studies that have looked into the effects of CA
punishment on PGG behaviour did not study the psycho-
logical mechanisms that may influence contribution levels
in response to punishment. For example, Guillen et al.
[20] demonstrated that individuals cooperated more with
CA sanction mechanisms compared to standard PGGs,
but with no explanation as to why. This paper aims to an-
swer this question by using a CA punishment rule to
study why people cooperate more when punished for free-
riding was implemented or not.
Behavioural heterogeneity in the PGGs and individual
differences in behavioural inhibition
A growing body of research has shown heterogeneity in
behavioural strategies in PGGs [21]. A wealth of studies
[22-24] have explored mechanisms linked to the beha-
viour of the punisher, but a gap still remains in the litera-
ture with regard to understanding the behaviour of those
who are punished or expect to be. Any variability in
responses to punishment could potentially be accounted
for by psychological mechanisms relating to individual dif-
ferences in motivation [25]. One way to explore the het-
erogeneity of behaviour associated with punishment is to
examine individual differences with respect to individuals’
sensitivity to punishment, which has been shown to pre-
dict responding under threat and punishment conditions,
as well as to responding to uncertainty [26-28].
Motivational processes, e.g. linked to motivational traits
of avoidance and approach [1], should potentially influence
how individuals react to punishment. The behavioural in-
hibition system (or BIS-reactivity), assessed psychometric-
ally (e.g. the BIS scale from the BIS/BAS questionnaire,
[29]) has been shown to explain individual behaviour in
situations when there is a threat of punishment [29]. Spe-
cifically, the BIS has been implicated in risk assessment
[10,30], choices under uncertainty [31] and risky behav-
iour in general, e.g. different forms of dependencies, psy-
chopathologies [27,32]. It is hypothesised, therefore, that
BIS-reactivity can explain some of the variance in indivi-
dual responses in the PGGs with punishment.
While BIS-reactivity is associated with traits such as
constraint, self-control and neuroticism, neither BIS-
reactivity nor related traits have been studied in relation
to levels of free riding in PGGs where punishment is po-
ssible. However, a study by Hirsh and Inzlicht [33] demon-
strated that individuals with high levels of neuroticism
(which is strongly correlated with BIS-reactivity) produced
a larger neural response to uncertainty than to negative
information presented without uncertainty in the context
of a cognitive task. Therefore, it is not clear whether re-
sponse to uncertainty in punishment expectations (pun-
ishment is expected, but it is either implemented or not)
would be associated with individual differences in traits
like BIS-reactivity or neuroticism.
Furthermore, it has been suggested that BIS-reactivity
is not a unified construct either conceptually [26] or in
terms of its psychometric assessment [28], but rather
comprises two systems: a pure reaction to punishment
or the flight, fight, freeze system (FFFS), and a reaction
to probable or expected punishment known as BIS-
anxiety [10,28]. This distinction has been demonstrated
also at the psychometric level. Specifically, the BIS-scale
can be re-scored to asses two respective conceptual sys-
tems: BIS-anxiety and FFFS [28]. As BIS-anxiety and
FFFS differ in their neural and physiological underpin-
nings, as well as in their behavioural outcomes, cf [26],
they should also have a different effect on behaviour in
the PGGs, specifically when comparing situations when
punishment either was or was not implemented. BIS-
anxiety, should more likely be involved in situations of
higher uncertainty (e.g., in the condition when punish-
ment was never implemented). Specifically, higher levels
of BIS-anxiety should prevent individuals from free ri-
ding when punishment is expected but not implemen-
ted. Therefore, those with high BIS-anxiety should choose
to cooperate to avoid punishment when punishment is
expected but non-implemented. Those with lower BIS-
anxiety, should choose to free ride more often, as it might
lead to a larger immediate individual rewards, despite the
risk of being caught. In contrast, we expected FFFS to
explain behaviour only in conditions when punishment
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was actually implemented and participants experienced
punishment.
Experimental design and predictions
In this study we manipulated the implementation of pun-
ishment in a CA punishment design. Such design mimics
a situation where a known fine or punishment (e.g., speed-
ing, parking) does not occur for every transgression. We
investigated how the implementation of punishment or
the mere possibility of expected punishment affects con-
tributions in a PGG and how behaviour under these con-
ditions are influenced by BIS-anxiety and FFFS.
We compared two punishment blocks (labelled as
implemented and non-implemented) to two standard
PGGs blocks without punishment. To ensure that the
punishment instruction did not change the behaviour of
participants, the first block was always a standard PGG
without punishment. The punishment instruction was
then introduced, followed by the remaining three blocks.
In addition, to ensure that the order of these three blocks
(implemented punishment, non-implemented punishment
and a standard game) did not have any effect on the con-
tribution levels, the order of three blocks was randomized
(see details below). Figure 1 depicts the schematic repre-
sentation of the experimental design.
The aim of this study was twofold: (1) to compare con-
tribution levels of PGGs when a risk of punishment was
not expected (a baseline standard PGGs block) with the
blocks when it was expected, and the expectations were
either met (implemented punishment block) or not (non-
implemented punishment block), and (2) to investigate if
there was an effect of differences in behavioural inhibition
on free riding behaviour in implemented versus non-
implemented punishment conditions.
In punishment conditions, regardless of whether or not
punishment was implemented, lower individual contribu-
tions should reflect diminished cooperation and increased
free riding. Furthermore, it was predicted that if indivi-
duals make choices about contributions taking into ac-
count the certainty of punishment, then contributions
should be higher when the expectation of punishment was
met (i.e. implemented punishment) in comparison to
when the punishment was expected but did not occur
(i.e. non-implemented punishment). Finally, lower BIS-
anxiety should lead to high levels of free riding (lower co-
operation) under conditions of non-implemented punish-
ment in comparison to implemented punishment, whilst
higher FFFS should lead to increased contributions under
implemented conditions.
Method
Participants and procedure
The sample consisted of 79 undergraduates (mean age
20.96, ranged from 18 to 36, 67.1% female). Questionnaires
were administrated using online software prior to the ex-
periment. The experiment took place in a computer room,
where all participants were seated in individual booths
with dividers. The experiment was programmed using
Z-Tree [34]. Participants received £3 as a show-up fee and
they had an opportunity to earn up to £5 extra. On aver-
age, participants received £6.67 (equivalent to 10.57 USD)
for a one-hour experiment. After finishing the experiment,
participants were debriefed and paid individually. The
experiment was approved by the School of Psychology,
University of Nottingham Ethics Committee. Written con-
sent was obtained from all participants.
Measures of motivational orientations
Following Heym et al. [28], we used four BIS-anxiety
items from the seven–item BIS scale from the Carver
and White [29] BIS/BAS questionnaire to calculate BIS-
anxiety (α = .83). We also calculated the fearfulness
(FFFS or flight, fight, fear system) component of BIS-
reactivity using the remaining three FFFS items from the
same BIS scale (α = .79). We also calculated the overall
BIS-reactivity using all seven of Carver and White’s BIS
scale (α = .81). There were no predictions with regard to
individual differences in BAS; therefore, analysis of this
scale was omitted from the results in this paper.
Figure 1 A schematic representation of the experimental procedure. See description in the text.
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The public goods game
The experiment comprised four blocks: two standard
PGGs (a baseline condition) and two punishment blocks.
At the start of the experiment, all participants played one
block of standard PGGs. After the first block, participants
received additional instructions for the next three blocks,
which introduced a punishment rule. The rule stated that
in some games they might be “fined” (punished) if they
contributed less on average than others in their group
(calculated by the computer). They were told that the
punishment rule would be applied only in some of the
blocks and they were informed before the beginning of
each block if the punishment rule operated in that block.
Thus if participants were not informed that the punish-
ment rule applied to that block, they knew they were play-
ing a standard PGG. After the punishment instruction
was introduced, they played the remaining three blocks of
games (two different punishment blocks and a standard
PGG without punishment). Participants were not expli-
citly informed how many blocks they would play.
The two punishment blocks had exactly the same
instructions - participants were told that they might re-
ceive punishment for free riding. The only difference be-
tween punishment blocks was that in the implemented
punishment block punishment actually occurred in two of
the 13 trials in the block. In the non-implemented punish-
ment block, punishment never occurred. The order of
three blocks after the punishment instruction was coun-
terbalanced through six pseudorandom sequences, with
approximately the same number of randomly allocated
participants (from 12 to 16) in each sequence.
Each block consisted of a number of one-shot games,
which are referred to here as trials. Each trial was an an-
onymous PGG, where participants played in groups of
four and had to divide their initial endowment of 20 MUs
(equal to £2) into the private and public/group account.
After everybody made their decisions, the investments
were calculated based on the following pay-off function:
pii ¼ 20 g i þ 0:5
X4
j¼1
g j
where a pay-off (pi) for a participant i is defined by their
contribution (g) and the sum of contributions of other
players.
After participants made their decisions and entered their
contribution into the group account, they received feed-
back about how much on average their group contributed
and how much they earned. On all trials, the information
they received about the group’s average contribution was
manipulated. However, in one trial, participants actually
played with each other as a group. Accordingly, partici-
pants were informed that all of the trials except for one
(a real trial) would not be played with people in the room,
and for the non-real trials all of the information that
appeared on the computer screen would be defined by the
experimenter. Participants were made aware that only the
earnings from the real trial would count towards their final
payment. As a result, no deception was involved in this
study, as the trials were organized in a Conditional Infor-
mation Lottery, see [35], for a discussion. In the debrief
participants stated that they were unable to detect which
was the real trial and had treated all trials as if they were
real.
The feedback about the contribution of other group
members for each participant was manipulated through
the design. Participants received feedback about a high
average group contribution level (between 16 and 18 MUs)
in two trials of each block, and in the rest the feedback
was medium (between 7 and 12 MUs). Including two high
contribution trials in each block ensured that the majority
of participants could experience punishment in the imple-
mented punishment block (as participants were only pun-
ished if they contributed less than the group average on
these high contribution trials), but also that the structural
parameters (contribution levels of group partners) of the
games did not vary across conditions. A varied schedule of
medium and high contribution levels was introduced to
imitate natural variability in the behaviour of group part-
ners, thus preventing participants from detecting high
contribution trials. Different numbers of trials in each
block ensured that participants could not predict how
many trials there were in each block (see Figure 1).
To investigate if motivational traits were associated
with free riding in the games we used both individual
contribution levels and whether or not a participant con-
tributed zero at least once in each condition as behav-
ioural outcomes. Both variables have previously been
used to index individual cooperation and free riding in
the PGGs, e.g. [36,37].
Results
Effects of punishment on contribution levels
To explore if there was a main effect of different punish-
ment conditions, a two-way mixed ANOVA, on average
contribution levels, was conducted. There was a within-
subjects factor of block (four levels – four blocks) and a
between-subjects factor of sequence (the order of the
blocks). The results revealed a main effect of block
(F(3,219) = 63.61, p < .001), no effect of the sequence (F(5,73) =
1.71, ns) and no significant interaction of sequence with
block (F(15,219) = 1.59, ns), demonstrating that the pseudo-
random ordering did not affect individual contribution
levels in each block. Figure 2 summarizes the results of
the main effect of block.
Post-hoc tests were conducted, with a Bonferroni cor-
rection, demonstrating that the mean contribution levels
of the initial standard PGG block were lower compared
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to the implemented (t (78) = −10.39, p < .001) and non-
implemented punishment blocks (t (78) = −7.15, p < .001);
the mean contribution level of a standard PGG block after
the punishment instructions was lower compared to the
implemented (t (78) = −10.70, p < .001) and non-
implemented punishment blocks (t (78) = −7.47, p < .001).
Thus, participants contributed more in blocks when they
either experienced punishmenta or when there was a pos-
sibility of punishment compared to two standard PGGs
blocks.
Contributions in the standard PGGs blocks were not
significantly different from each other (t (78) = 1.40, p =
.193): participants contributed similarly in the standard
PGG block before they received the instruction about pos-
sible punishment as compared to the standard PGG block
after they received the punishment instruction.
Contributions in the block when the punishment was
implemented were significantly higher than when the
punishment was not implemented (t (78) = 4.11, p < .001).
It could be possible that participants who experienced
an implemented punishment block prior to the non-
implemented punishment block (N = 40) were more likely
to expect punishment in the non-implemented punish-
ment block as compared to those who had experienced
these blocks in reverse order (N = 39). There were no
significant differences in the contribution levels between
those who experienced the implemented punishment
block before the non-implemented punishment block as
compared to those who had experienced these blocks in
the reversed order: the implemented punishment block
first (t (77) = −1.41, ns), the non-implemented punish-
ment block first (t (77) = −1.28, ns). Therefore, the order
of implemented punishment versus non-implemented
punishment blocks had no effect on choices in the PGGs.
Behavioural inhibition and the difference score
The means (M) and standard deviations (SD) for BIS-
reactivity were M = 2.93, SD = .56, for BIS-anxiety: M =
3.13, SD = .64, and for FFFS: M = 2.68, SD = .61. It was
expected that those higher in BIS-anxiety should con-
tribute more when the punishment is expected but not
implemented. A difference score between levels of con-
tributions in the implemented versus non-implemented
punishment blocks was calculated (contributions in the
implemented punishment condition minus contributions
in the non-implemented punishment condition: a posi-
tive score indicates that more was given in the imple-
mented condition than the non-implemented condition).
This score was used to analyse the effect of behavioural
inhibition on changes in contribution levels when punish-
ment was not implemented compared to when it was
implemented. This difference score was significantly
Figure 2 The mean (M) contribution levels for each block. Error bars represent standard errors of the mean, SEM). "*" denotes p < .001
significance level.
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negatively correlated with BIS-reactivity (r = −.237, p <
.05) and BIS-anxiety (r = −.240, p < .05), but not the FFFS
subscale (r = −.173, p = .13). Thus while the association of
the difference score with both FFFS and BIS-anxiety was
negative, the effects for BIS-anxiety were stronger and
reached significance level, whereas the association between
the difference score and FFFS subscale did not. Figure 3
summarized the results for BIS-anxiety in a scatter plot. It
supports the prediction that those high in BIS-anxiety
made higher contributions in the non-implemented as
opposed to the implemented punishment conditions.
Conversely, compared to the implemented punishment
condition, those low in BIS-anxiety gave less in the non-
implemented punishment condition.
Behavioural inhibition and zero contributions
As in Keser and van Winden [37], participants were
divided into zero contributors (i.e. those, who made at
least one zero contribution across all the games in the
block,) and non-zero contributors (i.e. those, who never
made a zero contribution during any of the games in a
particular block). An independent sample t-test demon-
strated that in the non-implemented punishment block
those who never gave a zero (i.e., always contributed
something: N = 70) were significantly higher in self-
reported BIS-anxiety (M = 3.00, SD = .61), compared to
those who made a zero contribution at least in some of the
games (i.e., free rode) (N = 9, M = 2.63, SD = .70; t (77) =
−2.50, p < .05). Figure 4 summarises these findings. The
two groups also differed significantly in BIS-reactivity
(t (77) = −2.80, p < .01) (not graphed). Thus in the
situation when the punishment was non-implemented
those who self-reported higher BIS-anxiety were more
likely to contribute at least something compared to those
with a lower BIS-anxiety. Due to the small number of par-
ticipants in one of the groups, we re-ran the analysis (and
all subsequent analyses in this section) with a non-
parametric Mann–Whitney test. Non-parametric analyses
supported the results of all parametric analyses.
Interestingly, relationships between BIS-anxiety and
zero contributions approached significance only for one
other condition: the standard PGG block after the punish-
ment. On the standard PGG block after the punishment
instruction, those who never made a zero contribution
(i.e., always contributed) in this block (N = 60) scored
higher BIS-anxiety (M = 3.20, SD = .58); compared to
those who made zero contribution (i.e., free rode) on at
least one of the games in the block (N = 19, BIS-anxiety
scores M = 2.89, SD = .78; t (77) = −1.83, p = .07). This
provides additional evidence in favour of the involvement
of BIS-anxiety in processing punishment risk contingen-
cies: once the punishment was announced as a condition
in some of the games, participants with higher levels of
BIS-anxiety avoided contributing nothing (made no zero
contributions on any trials of the remaining blocks).
FFFS and contribution levels under implemented
punishment condition
There was no correlation between contribution levels under
implemented punishment conditions and FFFS (r = −.001,
p = .97). The relationships between contribution levels in
the other blocks and FFFS were also non-significant.
Figure 3 Association of BIS-anxiety with the difference in contribution levels between the implemented and non-implemented
punishment condition. A positive difference score means that a participant decreased their contribution in a non-implemented condition
compared to the implemented condition. The trend line represents linear regression estimation.
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Behavioural inhibition and free-riding tendencies
To further test the hypothesis that BIS-anxiety should
prevent individuals from free riding when facing a possi-
bility of punishment, we examined if BIS-anxiety affects
behaviour of those who showed free riding tendencies.
The first standard PGGs block, before the punishment
instruction, was used to classify participants as free
riders and non-free riders. Those, who contributed in
this block less than the mean contribution of the group
(N = 23), were classified as free riders similar to proce-
dure was used in [38,39] b. As predicted, for free riders,
BIS-anxiety correlated positively with contribution levels
in the non-implemented punishment block (r = .433, p <
.05). Therefore, individuals with free riding tendencies,
when punishment not implemented, contributed more
only when they were higher in BIS-anxiety.
Discussion
This study contributes to the literature in several ways. It
supports previous findings demonstrating that an expect-
ation of punishment for free riding, whether it is imple-
mented or not, increased individuals’ contributions
significantly, compared to conditions without punishment
[13,40,41]. The results showed that individuals contribu-
ted more when the expectation of punishment was imple-
mented compared to when it was not. Further, the results
showed that behavioural inhibition, and specifically BIS-
anxiety, prevented individuals from free riding (i.e., led to
increased contribution levels) in a situation when punish-
ment was expected but was not implemented. Thus this
study shows that the possibility of punishment, whether
or not it is implemented, has an influence on the levels of
free riding, and subsequently cooperation. However, it fur-
ther indicates that basic motivational differences in the re-
action to punishment and uncertainty (i.e., behavioural
inhibition) can explain some of the heterogeneity in these
responses.
Possibility of punishment is enough to increase
contribution levels
There have been a number of recent investigations into
the effect of punishment on pro-social behaviour in social
dilemmas [13,42]. However, these studies mostly employ a
“real partners” design, which makes it impossible to ex-
perimentally control the feedback about group contribu-
tion levels. In those studies, punishment levels depend on
the contribution levels of real group partners as well as
the behaviour of the “punishers” in response. Thus, it is
difficult to assess how likely each individual is to receive a
punishment, as this depends not only on their behaviour,
but also on the behaviour of their group partners. Thus
the advantage of documenting the natural history of the
player is gained at the cost of losing some experimental
control.
Without deceiving participants [35], the design reported
here experimentally controlled the group contribution
levels as well as the amount of punishment they received.
Punishment contingencies (either implemented or non-
implemented) were fixed for all participants and did not
depend either on other players’ contribution levels or par-
ticipants’ individual contribution levels (unless they con-
tributed more than 17 MUs on the “punishing” trial). This
design differs from other research on the effects of pu-
nishment contingencies on behaviour in the social dilem-
mas, e.g. [13,42]. Accordingly, the design enabled us to
study behaviour in response to the fixed punishment con-
tingencies, revealing the basic regularities of behaviour
when facing a punishment or its possibility in the PGGs.
In line with the predictions, the results demonstrated
that the contribution levels under the conditions of ac-
tual (implemented) punishment were higher than when
the punishment was possible but never occurred (non-
implemented). This confirms general accounts of broader
theoretical models of decision-making, e.g. reinforcement
learning models [43], and suggests that the choice of a
beneficial decision in each trial was affected by the infor-
mation about reward/punishment risks. Specifically, in the
implemented punishment individuals could estimate the
“online” probability of punishment as higher, as they actu-
ally experienced the punishment, as compared to non-
implemented punishment condition. In cases when the
punishment was possible, but never occurred, “online”
probability of punishment could be estimated as lower. As
a result, they contributed less in the non-implemented
punishment condition compared to the implemented.
Behavioural inhibition affects contribution levels and zero
contributions when punishment is expected but not
implemented
It was hypothesized that BIS-anxiety would influence
behaviours as a function of punishment expectancy. Spe-
cifically, when punishment expectancies were not met, as
Figure 4 Differences in mean BIS-anxiety for zero and non-zero
contributors, a non-implemented punishment block. "*" denotes
p < .05 significance level.
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opposed to when they were, individuals high in BIS-
anxiety were more likely to contribute compared to those
low in BIS-anxiety. The results here supported this predic-
tion. In line with this prediction, those participants, who
reported higher BIS-anxiety, were more likely to keep
their contributions at a high level even when punishment
was expected but not implemented. Furthermore, those
who were higher in BIS-anxiety invested something on all
trials of the non-implemented punishment. Those who
were lower in BIS-anxiety were more likely to have given
a zero contribution (i.e., they free rode) on at least one of
the games. The same differences in BIS-anxiety were
maintained for the standard PGGs block after the punish-
ment instructions (i.e., after the punishment contingencies
were introduced in the game). Therefore, higher BIS-
anxiety was associated with decreased free riding beha-
viour when the punishment was more uncertain: expected
but not implemented.
Gray and McNaughton [1] have suggested that trait
behavioural inhibition (BIS as opposed to FFFS) should
modulate behaviours in situations of uncertainty. In this
experiment, uncertainty was manipulated by varying
punishment probability. Accordingly, those with higher
BIS-anxiety continued to respond in accordance with
punishment expectations, even when there was no threat
of punishment (the second standard PGG block). The
evidence reported here supports broader associations be-
tween behavioural inhibition and depression [44], which
in turn is linked to overvaluation of punishment contin-
gencies [45] and might lead to risk aversion in the situ-
ation of punishment uncertainty.
Low behavioural inhibition in free riders predicts lower
contribution levels when the risk of punishment is low
In line with the predictions, for those who demonstrated
free riding tendencies during a standard PGGs block, level
of BIS-anxiety predicted behaviour in the punishment
blocks. Specifically when punishment was implemented
there was no significant correlation between BIS-anxiety
and contribution levels for either free riders or non-free
riders. However, when punishment was not implemented,
previous free riders with higher BIS-anxiety contributed
more. This supports the findings of Block and Gerety
[46], who showed in a social dilemma that individuals
who had previously committed crime (offenders), were
more sensitive to changes in punishment risk than univer-
sity students. It is possible that individuals who showed
free riding preferences were more sensitive to the change
in punishment risk in the non-implemented punishment
condition, where the threat of punishment was not
confirmed. From our findings, previous free riders
reduced their contribution if they were also lower in
BIS-anxiety. Therefore, low BIS-anxiety could be
argued to be associated with more accurate assessment
of prevailing punishment contingencies, while high
BIS-anxiety is associated with overestimation of pun-
ishment contingencies.
Role of BIS-anxiety in threat expectation
Our findings are consistent with broader literature on anxiety
and avoidance motivation. As in Hirsh and Inzlicht [33], we
found that BIS-anxiety was specifically associated with behav-
ioural change when the certainty of punishment changes, but
not with behaviour under the conditions of punishment per
se. Specifically, BIS-anxiety did not correlate with individual
average contribution levels in each of the two punishment
conditions but only with the difference in contributions be-
tween conditions. This suggests that BIS-anxiety influences
choices in the specific situation when punishment was
expected but not implemented. All our effects were significant
only for BIS-anxiety. Further, contrary to our predictions, we
did not find a correlation between FFFS and contribution
levels under implemented punishment. This has implications
for our understanding of BIS-anxiety and associated traits
(e.g., neuroticism), suggesting that manipulations of uncer-
tainty (for example, through information about behaviour of
others or through the probability of punishment for free rid-
ing) can have as large effect on individuals higher in BIS-
anxiety and their subsequent behaviour, as actual experience
of punishment. Further, behavioural outcomes under uncer-
tain punishment conditions will differ as a function of BIS-
anxiety. Those who are low in BIS-anxiety should adjust much
faster to a decreased probability of punishment, and quicker
in switching back to behavioural strategies that were previ-
ously punished.
Conclusion
Conforming to the body of previous research, e.g.,
[39,42,47], punishment for free riding has a profound ef-
fect on contribution levels in the PGGs: when the pun-
ishment is expected, whether it is implemented or not,
aggregate cooperation increases. However, when punish-
ment is expected but not implemented some individuals
choose to free ride, while others continue to cooperate.
We showed that individual differences in BIS-anxiety can
help to differentiate levels of free riding when punishment
becomes less certain (expected but not implemented).
This finding may help explain why some people cannot
resist the temptation to free ride, even when facing a pos-
sible punishment for their actions. Our findings suggest
that reduced functioning of mechanisms associated with
trait behavioural inhibition are related to improved pun-
ishment risk assessment, which in turn can explain such
behaviours.
Endnotes
a Not all participants received a punishment in the
implemented punishment block, as the rule for being
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punished was contributing less than group partners,
which was 16 or 17 MUs. 74.7% participants experienced
punishment. The rest never experienced punishment, as
they contributed more than group average on the “pun-
ishing” trials. Additional analyses with only contribution
levels of participants who were punished did not change
significance of any results.
b By the structure of the game, mean average contri-
bution was 7 MUs. Therefore, under the conditions of
this experiment individuals free rode only when con-
tributed less than 7 MUs on average. Instead, those,
who contributed more than 7 MUs did not free ride (on
average).
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